Napoleon’s military successes resulted from a strategy of moving armies rapidly and striking quickly, sometimes by surprise, often so as to prevent the coordination of the forces opposing him, which he was then able to defeat piecemeal. This strategy necessitated a thorough knowledge of the terrain of the theatre of war, especially as quick movement precluded adequate supplying of his armies without a large amount of requisitioning in the area of operations. The answer to this strategy for Napoleon’s enemies was to maintain a threat while avoiding engagements until coordination could be achieved; relying on strong lines of supply, allied armies could await opportunity while Napoleon’s troops, chasing them, began to suffer from overextension of their supply lines. This strategy was used first in thePeninsular Campaign of 1811 by the duke of Wellington, who was able to open up Spain using supply lines through Portugal. It was used most dramatically by the Russian generals M.B. Barclay de Tolly andP.I. Bagration in their response to Napoleon’s invasion of Russia in 1812; they simply withdrew along parallel lines. Unable to win a decisive victory at Borodino on September 7, the only full-scale engagement of the campaign, Napoleon was eventually forced to retreat. The Russian armies then turned to pursuit; Napoleon was forced to march his army back along the same route he had come, now depleted of forage, through the Russian winter in which temperatures reached −30 °F (−35 °C). In this disastrous campaign, Napoleon lost 500,000 men, the faith of his allies, and the awe of his enemies.
Saturday, September 21, 2013
The defeat of Napoleon
Napoleon’s military successes resulted from a strategy of moving armies rapidly and striking quickly, sometimes by surprise, often so as to prevent the coordination of the forces opposing him, which he was then able to defeat piecemeal. This strategy necessitated a thorough knowledge of the terrain of the theatre of war, especially as quick movement precluded adequate supplying of his armies without a large amount of requisitioning in the area of operations. The answer to this strategy for Napoleon’s enemies was to maintain a threat while avoiding engagements until coordination could be achieved; relying on strong lines of supply, allied armies could await opportunity while Napoleon’s troops, chasing them, began to suffer from overextension of their supply lines. This strategy was used first in thePeninsular Campaign of 1811 by the duke of Wellington, who was able to open up Spain using supply lines through Portugal. It was used most dramatically by the Russian generals M.B. Barclay de Tolly andP.I. Bagration in their response to Napoleon’s invasion of Russia in 1812; they simply withdrew along parallel lines. Unable to win a decisive victory at Borodino on September 7, the only full-scale engagement of the campaign, Napoleon was eventually forced to retreat. The Russian armies then turned to pursuit; Napoleon was forced to march his army back along the same route he had come, now depleted of forage, through the Russian winter in which temperatures reached −30 °F (−35 °C). In this disastrous campaign, Napoleon lost 500,000 men, the faith of his allies, and the awe of his enemies.
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